Research on Factors about Executive Equity-based Incentive of the Listed Companies by 张秀凤
 
学校编码：10384                                分类号_______密级 ______ 








Research on Factors about Executive Equity-based Incentive 




指导教师姓名： 沈 维 涛 教 授 
专 业 名 称： 财 务 学 
论文提交日期： 2 0 1 1 年 4 月 
论文答辩时间： 2 0 1 1 年 6 月 
学位授予日期： 2 0 1 1 年 6 月 
 
答辩委员会主席：           
评    阅    人：           
 



































另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）
的研究成果，获得（               ）课题（组）经费或实验室的
















































（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 







                             声明人（签名）： 



















































































Executive equity-based incentive is one of the methods to solve the agency 
problem and has a 50s-year history in oversea capital markets. After Chinese 
government enacted executive equity-based incentive law in 2006, it has been applied 
in public companies. It appeared strange phenomena of “incentive to loss, shares fell 
salary rise”, which opposite the original intention of enhancing company performance. 
Research on the main factors impacting on using executive equity-based incentives 
and the level of executive equity-based incentive in public companies in China will 
help to understand the motives of the listed company, having realistic enlightening 
significance. 
This article explores the current situation of Chinese equity incentive system. 
Taking as specimens the listed companies during 2006 to 2010 in Shanghai or 
Shenzhen A share, this paper study the influence of four factors on using executive 
equity-based incentive and the level of executive equity-based incentive, including 
growing factor, profitability factor, cash abundance factor and managerial power 
factor. From the results, public companies are affected by agency problem, and there 
are more motives to employ equity incentive in growing companies. While there is 
more equity incentive and high level of equity incentive in the companies of simple 
structure of wages, especially in private enterprises, because they plan to keep their 
employees. When the more designing equity incentive could be controlled by CEO, 
the more equity interest can be applied. However, there is no evidence to prove the 
using of equity for saving cash reason now. The results show that there are both 
positive and negative factors of using equity incentive in Chinese public companies.  
This paper examines the relationship between cash abundance and equity 
incentive since the change of institutional environment in 2006, which provides the 
evidence of executives’ self-interest behavior. It is discovered that private public 
companies are focusing on equity interest encouragement to reward and attract 
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2005 年至 2006 年间，一系列的资本市场变革和法律法规的出台为上市公司





























股权分置改革后，股权激励的实施已走过 5 个年头，从 2006 年到 2011 年 2 月，
先后共有 215 家公司提出股权激励方案（其中 15 家公司提出 2 种不同的股权激
励方案）。 
正当我们为股权激励法律制度障碍解除而欢欣鼓舞之时，上市公司的股权




海南海药将 7220 万元费用计入 2007 年，导致当年亏损约 5000 万。“股跌薪涨”
的现象体现在马明哲的高价薪酬。中国平安在 2007 年 10 月到 2008 年 3 月期间，
A 股价格从最高 149.28 元暴跌到 56 元，市值缩水近三分之二，而中国平安马明















和检验两组样本均值是否存在显著差异的 T 检验和 Mann-Whitney 检验。回归分
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